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LIST OF PARTIES
Rule 24 (a) (1)

t h e Honorable, TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
Judge, in-the-: THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
WEST JORDAN, UTAH

Attorney for: CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N. A.
MIKEL M. BOLEY (037-5>
P. O. Box 70584
West Valley City, Utah 84170-0584

Appellee:

CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N. A.
AKA: AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD
P. O. Box 6402
The Lakes, Nevada 88901-6402

Appellant:

R. John Forte, pro se
4 Snow Forest Cove
Sandy, Utah 84092
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Rule 24 (a) (4)
The Utah Court of Appeals is the Court of competent jurisdiction for
this appeal from judgment in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Rule 24 (a) (5)
As presented to the Trial Court, the law is specific that where fraud is
an issue, the parties are returned to their status prior to the commission of the
fraud.

CITIBANK NA (SOUTH DAKOTA) or ATT&T UNIVERSAL

CARD established an open credit account based upon an alleged agreement
with me and for which such an agreement does not exist, therein the credit
card fraud was perpetrated by the issuer of the alleged credit account.
The issue of the lack of a signed agreement or contract by me has
never been addressed in the foreign arbitration or trial court proceedings- I
have placed the issue of a signed (properly executed) agreement and/or
contract before the trial court which has ignored the issue or intentionally
bypassed it.
At this point, CITIBANK NA (SOUTH DAKOTA) or ATT&T
UNIVERSAL CARD, is guilty of bypassing their obligation to provide a full
disclosure of their use of solicitation by means of the credit application
process to entrap me into an alleged agreement or contract. CITIBANK NA
(SOUTH DAKOTA) or ATT&T UNIVERSAL CARD, knowingly,
intentionally and willfully employed the credit application process as a
means of acquiring my signature without divulging the full terms and
conditions of their alleged agreement which I would have never agreed with
4-1

knowingly. The bank's credit application process was a designed deception
for the sole purpose of usurping the law against the lending of credit and the
acquition of my signature and Social Security Number under their false and
misleading solicitation process upon which their alleged agreement was
based.
Based upon the foregoing, the companion issue to the fraud is the
intentional usurpation of my Constitutional rights. The reservation of my
rights has been an issued in the prior proceedings which have never been
relinquished.
At issue is the failure of CITIBANK NA (SOUTH DAKOTA) or
ATT&T UNIVERSAL CARD to respond to my disclosure questionnaire.
Their silence is, in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, the
equivalent of fraud.
The issue of legal representation has been the source of contention for
me. The encouraged indebtedness by CITIBANK NA (SOUTH DAKOTA)
or ATT&T UNIVERSAL CARD has depleted my financial resources to a
poverty level thereby removing the employment of legal counsel from
consideration. I am unable to pay even the standard retainer.
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CITATION OF RECORD
Rule 24 (a) (5) (A)

Not being schooled in the legal system, I have, in an effort for brevity,
cited the issue in my Statement of Grounds that I believe are or should be
preserved in the record.
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STATEMENT OF GROUNDS
Rule 24 (a) (5) (B)
The default judgment that was issued by the Trial Court was based
upon a NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM AWARD. The arbitration
was done outside of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and was
lacking in persona jurisdiction. R John Forte, Appellant, was denied the
opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf as a result of the foreign
arbitration.
The counsel that R. John Forte did employ did not present his
evidence to the NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM even though he was
paid to do the work. This misrepresentation is at the heart of the motion to
have the default judgment set aside upon reconsideration.
The default judgment is based upon fraud and as such it is void on its
face. The Trial Court appears to have erred in their "in their rush to
judgment".
The Trial Court usurped Appellant's constitutional rights to have the
law governing 'bank lending practices' enforced in what can only be
described as credit lending. The actual exchange of money (as set forth in
the United States Constitution) did not happen. The Trial Court and
Attorney Mikel M. Boley knew or should have known that the law prohibits
banks from lending their credit.
6-1

Appellant has asked that CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N. A.,
AKA AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD produce a mutually signed agreement or
contract which would clearly demonstrate that an agreement does exist for
foreign or any binding arbitration and the acceptance of the bank lending its
credit as a substitute for money instead of money may and may exist
between the bank and my self To the writing of this appeal, none has been
produced though there are references to a unilateral agreement document
issued solely by the bank. Therefore, the Trial Court has abridged and/or
enforced a non-existent contract in the favor of the bank.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 24 (a) (6)
From the Dictionary of Lawyer International is taken the Definition
for the tprm "truth in lending act", to wit;
"Title I of the Consumer Protection Act: Requires that most
categories of lenders disclose the annual interest rate, the total dollar
cost and other terms of loans and credit sales." (emphasis added)

The "CREDITDISCLOSURE STATEMENT", is the legal right
Authorized by the "Truth in Lending Law " to request disclosure of
material facts of the purported loans or notes. Transaction Statements
do not comply with the legal right of disclosure, therefore are not a
valid disclosure of fact. Any refusing to disclose the material facts of
the purported loans and notes violates 12 CFR 226 17c (1) of the
Truth in Lending Law.
AMS 5 - DP:

Federal Right to Due Process

AM 14 - DP:

State Right to Due Process

Material disclosures:
12 CFR 226.5 & 226.6 (open end credit); 12 CFR 226.5a & 226.6
(credit cards);
7-1

"A Bank can lend its own money and that of other depositors with it
for a profit... it is money, not its credit that a Bank is to lend..>

Neither as Included in its (bank's) powers nor incidental to them is it a
part of a Bank's business to lend its credit."

In a Thesis entitled, "On the Law of Banks and Banking", by John T.
More, Jr. he writes; United States Code, Title 12, Section 24 declares
that banks "shall have power to carry on the business of banking...
by loaning money on personal securities." This section does not
authorize Banks to loan on credit.

"The Powers of a National Bank are Limited". They are limited by
statute, Section 5136, Revised Statutes (Title 12, Section 24, U.S.C.A
Section 24) It is not within those statutory powers for a National Bank, even
through solvent, to lend its credit to another in any of the various ways in
which that might be done. The following case cites have well established
the bank's statutory powers.
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Magee, Bank and Banking 3r ed, p. 366; Bank of Valdosta v. Baird
(C. C. A. 8) 160 F 642,17L.R.

A., N. S. 526; Farmers Bank v.

Bluefield National Bank, 11 F. 2d 83, certiorari denied 271 U. S.
669, 46 s. cL 483, 70 L Ed. 1142; People's National Bank v. South
States, etc Co., 192 N. C. 69,133 S. E, 415, 49 A. L. R. 519; Board
of Commissioners v. Citizen's Trust & Savings Bank, 73 Ind. App.
76,123 N. E. 130; National Bank v. Morgan, 258 S. W. 572; Rice &
Hutch ins Atlanta Co. v. Commercial National Bank, 18 Ga. App.
151, 88 S> E> 99; Howard & Foster Co. v. Citizen's National Bank,
133 S. C 202,130 S. E. 758; Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v.
L 'Herisson, 33 F 2 de 841.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
Rule 24 (a) (7)

The issuer of the credit card failed to comply with stated law in at
least several vital issues. This is the basis for the establishment of fraud
upon appellant, R. John Forte. The law as written is clear as to the duties of
the Appellee, CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N. A.
The first issue is the failure of CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N A
to full disclose all of the terms and condition under which a credit card could
be issued. This is a deceptive practice that is designed to void all protections
established by the "Truth in Lending Act" and the "Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act".
Issue number two deals with the refusal to fully disclose in
accordance to Title 12, Part 226, Section 226.5 (a) (3) or upon request the
alleged agreement to be signed or signed by R. John Forte wherein I agreed
to arbitration that was selected solely by CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA)
N. A. or its attorneys. No such agreement exists. The arbitration was done
outside of the trial court's jurisdiction and outside of the State of Utah
thereby voiding my right to appear and address my accuser or the issues.
Issue number three deals with "money" which was never the issue in
the case. The insistence of establishing credit as money is dealt with in the
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Wikipedia Encyclopedia definition under "Money" in sub-part 3, "Credit as
money". It must be recognized as money or a unit of exchange by the
agreement of the parties. CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N. A. failed to
obtain my agreement for the use of credit as money in an understandable
written notice.
Issue number four deals with the prohibition as established by the
United States Supreme Court and the applicable federal and state laws that
'banks' are prohibited from lending their credit. This fact was not revealed
and has been totally ignored in the proceedings by the Trial Court.
Concluding with an admonition from King David in Psalm 82:2 from
The Living Bible or Psalm 82:1-4 from the Life Application Bible, where he
implored the judges, to wit; "Judges listen to the evidence". This is truer
today than it has ever been in the past. I have been deprived of the
opportunity to present my evidence as set forth herein. All matters appear to
have been decided in the Judge's Chambers outside of my knowing and
absent any in courtroom hearing in order to afford me the opportunity to
rebut.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Rule 24 (a) (8)
In addressing the Honorable Court, my summary of the argument is a
simple one. For the reasons contained herein I believe that my
constitutionally protected rights to a fair hearing of the issues were
knowingly, willfully and intentionally usurped.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that those who act in such
a manner violate the law and are to be held accountable.
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ARGUMENT
Rule 24 (a) (9)
The manner in which the trial court dealt with this matter through the
unilateral issuance of a default judgment, the acceptance by the trial court of
a foreign arbitration award that lacked persona jurisdiction which violates
Appellant's constitutionally protected right to a proper hearing of the issues
in a court of competent jurisdiction, and when elected, before a jury.
The trial court is looked to as knowing the law and to enforce the
letter, spirit and intent of the law in an equitable manner. There are several
points that bring into question the action of the trial court.
1.

Where arbitration and trial court records show absolutely no
evidence of a valid agreement or contract and the claim was not
proved by material evidence presented to the court and entered
on the record in support of a valid claim by the appellee, the
judgment is void, a nullity, conveying no interest, and granting
no rights.

2.

Does the trial court recognize the inequality associated with an
arbitration done based upon an alleged agreement or contract
and done in a foreign jurisdiction at the behest of an attorney
where no evidence of an agreement to arbitrate exists? No one
should be forced to accept such a violation of his or her rights.
10-1

3.

Attorney? who purchase evidence of debt, then prosecute an
action in the name of the original maker of the loan are
engaging in criminal activity and attorneys who prepare and
submit false documents to a court are committing felonies

4.

The greatest single public concern in this present action before
the Court is the misleading perception that the trial court will
use its good office to prevent wrongs and apply the applicable
law as a matter of course.

5.

Where a judgment is void on its face, courts have a nondiscretionary duty to vacate the void judgment and duty to
remand those who have committed criminal acts to othet
authority for considered prosecution

6.

The public perception of the trial court is that it has a full and
complete understanding of the law for banks and banking. In
this case, the laws dealing with banking and the use of credit as
money and the legal requirement of full disclosure of all terms
and conditions prior to accepting an application. Nowhere in
my research did I find an exemption from the banking laws and
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disclosure requirement that could be applied to an exception for
the banks to lend credit.
7.

Credit when used as money, being a poor substitute, needs the
full understanding of both parties involved in its usage. Credit
used as money completely fails the criterion as defined in the
"Essential Characteristics of Money" in that it does not satisfy
the second of three characteristics, "It must be a unit of
account". Thus an agreement for its usage by the parties
becomes mandatory.

8.

The laws which prohibit the banks from lending their credit are
being ignored. The appellant, having his liquid resource
depleted to zero is left to the unbridled attacks by the banks and
their attorneys. The laws which were designed to protect the
public (appellant) are muted. The appellant in this case is left
with no recourse other than the prohibitively expensive appeal
process which I have chosen to initiate on my own behalf.

In summation, I am seeking the Court's review to right what I believe
has been a grievous wrong.
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CONCLUSION
Rute 24 t a ^ i t f )
Wherfcas the remedy being sought is the vacating of the denial of
reconsideration of a void judgment, the vacating of the default judgment
which was void on its face, the abatement of the arbitration award which
was void on its face for lack of persona jurisdiction, failure of the arbitrator
to obtain bi-lateral agreement to arbitrate and dismissal of this matter for
cause.
Whereas this court has actual knowledge, that like trial court, this
court and all courts lack judicial discretion to review a void judgment; and
Whereas this court has actual knowledge that the record made in the
trial court verifies that the judgment in the Salt Lake County case, number
05012534, is facially void;
Whereas this court's non-discretionary duty is to vacate the void
judgment, remand 05012534 with instruction to the Salt Lake County court
to repair R. John Forte, atid remand all culpable parties to other authority for
considered prosecution.
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ADDENDUM
Rule 24 (a) (11)
In accordance with Rule 24 (a) (11), no addendum is necessary.
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ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 24 (a) (11) (A)
In accordance with law and codified in ihe Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act at 15 USC §1692 et seq., and which states in relevant part:
"A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt" which includes "the false -representation -of4he character, or
legal status of-any debt;" and "the threat to take any action that
cannot legally be taken"
Federal Statutes (Additional):

15 USC 1601
18 USC 4
18 USC 1961
18 USC 1962
18 USC Chapter 63, Section 1541 & 1342
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CASE CITES
Rule 24 (a) (11) (B)

In Re: Myers v, MBNA America -and North American Capital Corporation,
CV 00-163-MDWM (D. Mont, March 20, 2001V
"Myers argued that the arbitration clause was unenforceable under
Montana law because she never agreed under the contractual
relationship between the parties to arbitrate her dispute with MBNA,
MBNA argued that the clause is enforceable and valid as an
amendment that Myers agreed to allow wrhen she accepted a card and
credit line from MBNA in 1997."
"In striking down MBNA's motion to compel arbitration. Chief Judge
Donald W. Molloy found that the 'Arbitration Section' cannot be
enforced, and that no such agreement to arbitrate could be implied.
Observing that MBNA's proposal of the 'Arbitration Section' as a
change in the terms of the parties' relationship that would be effective
unless rejected by the cardholder, Chief Judge Molloy declared that,
in affect, "MBNA skipped offer and went straight to acceptance".
In re: American Red Cross v. Community Blood Center of the Ozarhs, 257
F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 07/25/2001); RazorsoftInc. v. Mahal Inc.. Okla. App.
Div. L 907 P.2d 1102 (1995); Millikan v Booth Okla. 713, 46 P. 489
(1896); Atchison. T. & S.F. Rv. Co. v. Lambert 31 Okla. 300, 121 P. 654,
Ann. Cas. 1912 E, 329 (1912); City of Guthrie v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co..
5 Okla, 774, SOP, 84 (1897); Payne v. Dewitt Okla.. 995 P. 2d 1088
(1999): Reedv. Scott Okla. 820 P.2d 445, 20 A.L.R. 5th 913 (1991); Graves
v Walters, Okla. App, 534 P.2d 702 (1975); Ross v. Ross. Okla. 201 Okla.
174, 203 P.2d 702 (1949); Thomas c. Sweet Okla. 173 Okla. 601, 49 P.2d
557 (1935) and Cudd v. Farmers' Exch, Bank of Lindsay, Okla., 76 Okla.
317, 185 P. 521(1919).
This court is noticed: the court below awarded a judgment by default
sua sponte without any evidence whatsoever, being entered on the
record. Even a default judgment must be proved and without
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evidence entered on the record with notice and opportunity to the
opposing party to use basic forensic devises to test the sufficiency of
the evidence, the judgment is void.
In re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco Homes, Inc. No.98-50117 February 18,
199915th Circuit Court of Appeals.) Volume 29 of the New Jersey Practice
Series, Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566
Where the complaining party can not prove the existence of the note,
then there is no note. To recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff
must prove: (1) the existence of the note in question; (2) that the party
sued signed the note; (3) that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the
note; and (4) that a certain balance is due and owing on the note.
In re: Bruce v. Miller. 360 P.2d 508, 1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960).
A void judgment cannot constitute res judicata. Denial of previous
motions to vacate a void judgment could not validate the judgment or
constitute res judicata, for the reason that the lack ofjudicial power
inheres in every stage of the proceedings in which the judgment was
rendered.
In re: High v. Southwestern Insurance Company, 520 P.2d 662, 1974 OK 35
(Okla. 03/19/1974)
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights
are divested; from it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless, in its
self, all proceedings founded upon it are necessarily equally
worthless, and have no effect whatever upon the parties or matters in
question. A void judgment neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
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performed under it, and all claims flowing out of it, are absolutely
void. The parties attempting to enforce it are trespassers."
In re: 18 USC 1961 & 1962 and Oklahoma Statutes Title 21. Crimes and
Punishments, Chapter 13, Section 453 Cited under the Uniformity of Law
ActAttorney Buying Evidence of Debt-Misleading Court:
Every attorney who either directly or indirectly buys or is interested in
buying any evidence of debt or thing in action with intent to bring suit
thereon is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any attorney who in any
proceeding before any court of a justice of the peace or police judge
or other inferior court in which he appears as attorney, willfully
misstates any proposition or seeks to mislead the court in any matter
of law is guilty of a misdemeanor and on any trial therefore the state
shall only be held to prove to the court that the cause was pending,
that the defendant appeared as an attorney in the action, and showing
what the legal statement was, wherein it is not the law. If the defense
be that the act was not willful the burden shall be on the defendant to
prove that he did not know that there was error in his statement of
law." Any person guilty of falsely preparing any book, paper,
[({record, })], instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with
intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced as genuine upon any
[({trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, })] authorized by law,
SHALL BE GUILTY Of A FELONY.
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Ancillary Federal Case Cites addressing the issues (Additional):
American Red Cross v. Community Blood Center of the Ozarks,
257 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 07/25/2001)
Carter v. Fenner,
136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998)
Elliott v Peirsol,
1 Pet. 328. 340. 26 U.S. 328. 340 (1828)
In Re Investors & Lenders. Ltd
165 B.R. 389 (Bkrtcv.D.NJ.1994)
In Re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco Homes, Inc.,
No.98-50117 February 18. 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals)
Lubben v Selective Serv Sys, Local Bd. No. 27.
453 F.2d 645. 649. (1st Cir. 1972)
Matter of Staff Mortg & Inv Corp,
550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977)
Qrner v. Shalala,
30 F. 3d 1307. (Colo. 1994)
Roller v. Holly,
176 U.S. 398. 409
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232. 94 S. Ct. 1683. 1687 (1974)
Small v. Batista,
22 F. Supp.2d 230. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois,
209 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill 1962)
Ancillary State and other Case Cites addressing the issues (Additional):
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Atchison, T. &S.F. RyCo. v. Lambert,
31 Okla. 300, 121 P. 654, Ann. Cas 1912 E, 329 (1912)
Bruce v. Miller,
360 P.2d 508,1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960)
City of Guthrie v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co
5 Okla. 774, 50 P. 84(1897)
Cudd v. Farmers' Exch. Bank of Lindsay,
76 Okla. 317, 185 P. 521 (1919)
Graves v. Walters,
Okla. App. 534 P.2d 702 (1975)
High v. Southwestern Insurance Company,
520 P.2d 662,1974 OK 35 (Okla. 03/19/1974)
Millikan v. Booth,
Okla. 713,46 P. 489 (1896)
Payne v. Dewitt,
Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999)
Razorsoft Inc. v. Maktal, Inc,
Okla. App. Div. 1, 907 P.2d 1102 (1995)
Reedv. Scott, Okla
820 P.2d 445,20 A.L.R. 5* 913 (1991)

Ross v. Ross, Okla
201 Okla. 174,203 P.2d 702 (1949)
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Thomas c. Sweet,
Okla. 173 Okla. 601, 49 P.2d 557 (1935)
Valley Vista Development Corp. v. City of Broken Arrow,
766 P.2d 344, 1988 OK 140 (Okla. 12/06/1988)

Other Persuasive authorities relevant to the issues (Additional):

Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Ruth,
57 Wash. App. 783, 790, 790 P.2d 206 (1990)
Butdell v City of Harvey,
212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991)
Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp,
46 Wash. App. 517, 520, 731 P.2d 533 (1987)
Carnegie Bank v Shalleck
256 N.J. Super 23 (App. Div 1992)
Chavez v. County of Valencia,
86 N.M. 205, 521 R2d 1154 (1974)
Cincinnati School Dist. Bd of Eduv Hamilton City, Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company v. Finesilver,
No. 69363 (Ohio App. Dist.8 04/25/1996)
GE Capital Hawaii^ Inc. v. Yoneimka
25 P.3d 807,96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001)
Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority
28 Conn. L. Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000)
In re: Bd. of Revision (2000),
87 Ohio St. 3d 363, 368
In re Marriage ofBrighterowsla,
50 Wash. App. 633, 635,749 P.2d 754 (1988)
In re TIP-PA-HANS enterprises, Inc,
27 B.R. 780,783(1983)
In re: Leen,
62 Wash. App. at 478
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In re: Thomas,
906 S.W. 2d at 262
In re: Weaver Cotistr,
190 Colo, at 232, 545 P. 2d at 1045
LOGS V American

Energy Savers, Inc.,
168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841(1988)

Mendoza v City of Corpus Christi, Tex. App
13 Dist., 700 S.W. 2d 652, 654
Good v. Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App.
177,180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990)
Love v. Packer,
174 N.C. 665, 94 S.E. 449,450
Patton v. Diemer (1988),
35 Ohio St. 3d 68
Pacific Concrete F.C. U. V. Kauanoe,
62 Haw 334,614 P.2d 936 (1980)
Solon v. Godbole,
163 111. App. 3d 845, 11411
The People v. Brewer,
128 111. 472,483 (1928)
TownofBrookfieldv. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc
513 A.2d 1218,201 Conn. 1 (1986)
Von Ketiler et al v Johnson,
57 111. 109 (1870)
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RECORD ON APPEAL
Rule 24 (a) (II) (€)
The Court is noticed of the request for disclosure that was sent to
the Petitioner/Appellee in an effort to establish whether or not a valid
claim existed. (See Exhibit "A")
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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FROM CREDITOR
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT PRACTICES ACT 15 USC § 1692 (g)
This statement and the answers contained herein may be used by Respondent, if necessary, in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
Notice:

This Debt Collector Disclosure Statement is not a substitute for, nor the equivalent of, the hereinaboverequested verification of the record, i.e. ""Confirmation of correctness, truth or authenticity, by affidavit,
oath, or deposition" (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1990), re the alleged debt, and must be
completed in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC §1692g, applicable portions
of Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 CFR 226, and demands as cited above in Offer of Performance.
Debt Collector must make all required disclosures clearly and conspicuously in writing; re the following:

1. Name of Debt Collector or Alleged Creditor: ___
2.

Address of Debt Collector or Alleged Creditor:

3.

Name of alleged Debtor:

4.

Address of alleged Debtor:

5.

Alleged Account Number:

6.

Alleged debt owed: $

7.

Date alleged debt became payable:

8.

Re: This alleged account, what is the name and address of the alleged Original Creditor, if different from Debt
Collector/Alleged Creditor?

9.

Re: This alleged account, if Debt Collector/Alleged Creditor is different from alleged Original Creditor, does Debt
Collector/Alleged Creditor have a bona fide affidavit of assignment to enter into alleged original contract between
alleged Original Creditor and alleged Debtor?
YES,
NO

__
_ _

/

/

10. Did Debt Collector/Alleged Creditor purchase this alleged account from the alleged Original Creditor?
NO or

YES,

N/A (Not Applicable)

11. If applicable, date of purchase of this alleged account from alleged Original Creditor, and purchase amount:
Date:

/

/

Amount: $

12. Did Debt Collector/Alleged Creditor purchase this alleged account from a previous debt collector?
NO, or

YES,

N/A

13. If applicable, date of purchase of this alleged account from previous debt collector^ and purchase amount:
Date:

/

/

, Amount: $

14. Regarding this alleged account, Debt Collector/Alleged Creditor is currently the:
(a) Owner;
(b) Assignee;
(c) Other - explain:
15. What are the terms of the transfer of rights, re: this alleged account?

EXHIBIT "A"
Disclosure Statement

Page 3 of 3

16. Tf applicable, transfer of rights, re this alleged account was executed by the following method:
(a) Assignment;

(b) Negotiation;

(c) Novation;

(d) Other - explain:

17. If the transfer of rights, re: this alleged account was by assignment and was there consideration paid?
NO,

YES,

N/A

18. What is the nature and cause of the consideration cited in # 17 above?

19. If the transfer of rights, re: this alleged account was by negotiation or was the alleged account taken for value?
YES,

NO,

N/A

20. What is the nature and cause of any value cited in #19 above?

21. If the transfer of rights re this alleged account was by novation, was consent given by alleged Debtor?
YES,

NO,

N/A

22, What is the nature and cause of any consent cited in # 21 above?

23. Has Debt Collector/Alleged Creditor provided alleged Debtor with the requisite verification of the alleged debt as
required by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act?
YES
NO
24. Date said verification cited above in # 23 was provided alleged Debtor:

/

/

25. Was said verification cited above in # 23 in the form of a sworn or affirmed oath, affidavit, or deposition?
NO
26. Verification cited above in # 23 was provided alleged Debtor in the form of:

OATH,

YES

AFFIDAVIT,

DEPOSTION
27. Do Debt Collector/Alleged Creditor have knowledge of any claim(s)/defense(s) re: this alleged account?
NO

YES

28. What is the nature and cause of any claim(s)/defense(s) re: this alleged account?

29. Was alleged Debtor sold any products/services by Debt Collector/Alleged Creditor?

YES

NO

30. What is the nature and cause of any products/services cited above in # 29?

31, Does there jexist a verifiable, bona fide, original commercial instrument between Debt Collector/Alleged Creditor and
alleged Debtor containing alleged Debtor's bona fide signature?

YES

NO

32^ What is the nature and cause of any verifiable commercial instrument cited above in # 31 ?

33. Is there in existence verifiable evidence of an exchange of a benefit or detriment between Debt CQllector/Alleged
Creditor and alleged Debtor?
YES
NO

Disclosure Statement

Page 2 of 3

34. What is the nature and cause of this evidence of an exchange of a benefit or detriment as cited above in # 33?

35. is there any evidence in existence ot a ventiable external act(s) giving fhe objective semblance of agreement between
Debt Collector/Alleged Creditor and alleged Debtor?
YES
NO
3i>. What is the nature and cause of any external act(s) giving the objective semblance of agreement from #35 above?

37. Have any charge-offs been made by any creditor or debt collector regarding this alleged account?

YES

NO

38. Have any insurance claims been made by any creditor or debt collector regarding this alleged account?

YES

NO

39. Have any tax write-offs been made by any creditor or debt collector regarding this alleged account?

YES

NO

40. Have any tax deductions been made by any creditor or debt collector regarding this alleged account?

YES

NO

41. Have any judgments been obtained by any creditor or debt collector regarding this alleged account?

YES

NO

42. At the time the alleged original contract was executed, were all parties apprised of the meaning of the terms and
conditions of said alleged original contract?
YES
NO
43. At the time the alleged original contract was executed, were all parties advised of the importance of consulting a licensed
legal professional before executing the alleged contract?
YES
NO
44. At the time the alleged original contract was executed, were all parties apprised that said alleged contract was a private
credit instrument?
YES
NO
Debt Collector's failure, both intentional and otherwise, to answer completely points " 1 " through "44" above and return
this Debt Collector Disclosure Statement, as well as providing the Respondent with the requisite verification validating the
hereinabove-referenced alleged debt, constitutes Debt Collector's tacit agreement that Debt Collector has no verifiable,
lawful, bona fide claim re: the hereinabove-referenced alleged account, and that Debt Collector tacitly agrees that Debt
Collector/Alleged Creditor waives all claims against Respondent and indemnifies and holds Respondent harmless against any
and all costs and fees heretofore and hereafter incurred and related re: any and all collection attempts involving the
hereinabove-referenced alleged account.
Declaration: The Undersigned hereby declares under penalty of perjury of the laws of this State that the statements made
in this Debt Collector Disclosure Statement are true and correct in accordance with the Undersigned's best firsthand
knowledge and belief.

Date

Printed name of Signatory

Official Title of Signatory

Authorized Signature for Debt Collector

Debt Collector must titnely complete and return this Debt Collector Disclosure Statement, along with all required
documents referenced in said Debt Collector Disclosure Statement. Debt Collector's claim will not be considered if any
portion of this Debt Collector Disclosure Statement is not completed and timely returned with all required documents, which
specifically includes the requisite verification, made in accordance with law and codified in the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act at 15 USC §1692 et seq., and which states in relevant part: UA debt collector may not use any false, deceptive,
or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt" which includes "the false
representation of the character, or legal status of any debt" and "the threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken"
all of which are violations of law. If Debt Collector does not respond as required by law, Debt Collector's claim will not be
considered ana Debt Collector may be liable for damages for any continued collection efforts, as well as any other injury
sustained by Respondent. Please allow thirty (30) days for processing after Respondent's receipt of Debt Collector's
response.
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Certificate of M a i ling
I, R Johil Forte, certify that on

S I j( o£>

, 2006,1 mailed a true and

correct copy of APPELLATE BRIEF, postage prepaid via United States Mail, addressed as
follows:
MIKEL M. BOLEY (0375)
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 70584
West Valley City, Utah 84170-0584

Respectfully submitted,
Dated:

$ I It I oC
R John Kprtj

